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SUPPLEMENTAL WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS,
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
WARREN

SHATTUCK

5

It is now nearly three years since the Washington Annotations
to the Restatement of Contracts was published. During this interval several developments have taken place. The Contracts
Restatement has received an ever-increasing recognition from both
courts and practitioners throughout the country.' Such recognition was perhaps inevitable in view of the eminence and ability
of the men who formulated the propositions set out in the Restatement. It is the product of much labor, by Professor Williston
and his fellow reporters, and by the distinguished judges, attorneys and teachers who constitute the American Law Institute.
More particularly, recognition has progressed in Washington. Both
Restatement and Annotations have had a wide sale here and our
supreme court has cited the former in several recent decisions. 2
During these three years our supreme court has adjudicated
several hundred issues of contract law, eloquent evidence of the
rapidity with which obsolescence attacks any volume of annotations which is not kept current. Since the Restatement can be
most efficiently used only when all of the local decisions are readily
accessible, it has appeared advisable to prepare this supplement.'
It is hoped that such current annotations may be published at
shorter intervals of time in the future.
Section 5
A writing by the terms of which X promises to pay for the
hauling of designated dirt and Y promises to haul it is a bilateral
contract binding Y to do the hauling. X's promise to furnish the
dirt will be implied in fact. Harms, Inc. v. Meade, 186 Wash. 287,
57 P. (2d) 1052 (1936).
Section 12
A writing by the terms of which X promises to pay for the
hauling of designated dirt and Y promises to haul it is a bilateral
contract obligatory on both parties. It is not a mere offer by Y
under which Y can cease performance at will. Harms, Inc. v.
Meade, 186 Wash. 287, 57 P. (2d) 1052 (1936).
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS, p. 164, 3rd Ed.
'Wax v. Northwest Seed Co., 189 Wash. 212, 64 P. (2d) 513 (1937)
(§73); North Pacific Public Service Co. v. Clark, 185 Wash. 132, 52 P.
(2d) 1255 (1936) (§ 122); First National etc. Co. v. United States Trust
Co., 184 Wash. 212, 50 P. (2d) 904 (1935) (§133); Brock v. Button,
187 Wash. 27, 59 P. (2d) 761 (1936) (§ 192); Miller v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 269, 64 P. (2d) 1050 (1937) (§236); State ex tel. Union
etc. Assn. v. Sup. Ct. 176 Wash. 482, 30 P. (2d) 231 (1934) (§375);
Irwin v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 188 Wash. 572, 63 P. (2d) 382
(1936) (§420); Broderson v. Rainier National Park Co., 187 Wash. 399,
60 P. (2d) 234 (1936) (§574).
3Copyright, 1938, American Law Institute.
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Section 24
An instrument, otherwise a warehouse receipt, does not show
a contract of sale just because it recites: "The said Fred Schwab
Commission Company hereby agrees to pay the seller the cash
market value of the said wheat, upon demand and the surrender
of this receipt." This statement is an offer. Barnes v. Patrick,
176 Wash. 142, 28 P. (2d) 293 (1934).
Section 26
Negotiations produce no contract where the parties contemplate that no obligation will arise until a formal written contract
is executed, and such writing is not executed. Strange & Co. v.
Puget Sound Machinery Depot, 176 Wash. 90, 28 P. (2d) 111
(1934).
To a written offer the offeree replied: "Accepted--subject to
your satisfying me of your ability to finance this contract, and
subject to a final contract being drawn covering all details, at
the price set out (in the offer), same to be to my satisfaction and
to be signed within five (5) days of date of award." These two
communications were held to form a contract, the court indicating
as bases for the decision: (1) waiver, in that the offeree refused
to join in a formal written contract; (2) the fact that the offer
and acceptance showed an agreement as to all of the details of
the proposed contract. Payne v. Ryan, 183 Wash. 590, 49 P. (2d)
53 (1935).
Section 27
See McPherson Bros. Co. v. Okanogan County, 45 Wash. 285,
88 Pac. 199 (1907).
Section 40 (1)
An offer may, before acceptance, be modified by the offeror. He
may set a time limit and an acceptance after such time has expired is ineffective. Wax v. Northwest Seed Company, 189 Wash.
212, 64 P. (2d) 513 (1937).
Section 59
Where X, in reply to an offer from Y to sell lumber f.o.b. X's
trucks, proposed that Y load the lumber on railroad cars for an
additional compensation, Y's offer is not thereby accepted. Martinson v. Carter., 190 Wash. 502, 68 P. (2d) 1027 (1937).
Section 60
Y offered to sell lumber to X f.o.b X's trucks. X's reply, proposing that Y load the lumber on railroad cars for an additional
compensation, is a counter-offer and not an acceptance. Martinson v. Carter., 190 Wash. 502, 68 P. (2d) 1027 (1937).
Section 70
To the earlier annotation add: Menz. Lbr. Co. v. McNeeley &
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Co., 58 Wash. 223, 108 Pac. 621 (1910) ; Pierson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 61 Wash. 450, 112 Pac. 509 (1911); Denbigh v.
First National Bank, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918); Union
Mach. & Supply Co. v. Taylor-Morrison Logging Co., 143 Wash.
154, 254 Pac. 1094 (1927).
Section 72 (1)
An offer to rescind a contract for the purchase of real property
is not accepted by the offeree's silence. Roethemeyer v. Milton,
177 Wash. 650, 33 P. (2d) 99 (1934).
X sent to Y his check, accompanied by a letter indicating that
the remittance was sent as a part payment of W's debt to Y and
on the condition that Y extend the maturity date of that debt for
an indicated period. Y replied, proposing a more limited extension. X's failure to answer that counter-offer is not an acceptance
of it. Maxwell v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 Wash. 560,
41 P. (2d) 147 (1935).
A purported acceptance, made after the offer has expired, is a
counter-offer and is not accepted by the offeree's silence. Wax v.
Northwest Seed Co., 189 Wash. 212, 64 P. (2d) 513 (1937).
Section 72 (2)
The vendee under a contract to purchase real property sent to
the vendor a quitclaim deed reciting in part: "This deed is given
to surrender and rescind contract between the parties hereto for
the purchase of the above described real estate . . ." This is an
offer to rescind and retention of the deed by the vendor for two
months is not an acceptance. He attempted no dominion over
the property and owed no duty to return the deed. Roethemeyer
v. Milton, 177 Wash. 650, 33 P. (2d) 99 (1934).
X sent to Y his check accompanied by a letter indicating that
the check was sent as part payment of W's debt to Y and on the
condition that Y extend the maturity date of that debt for an
indicated period. This is an offer, accepted by Y's cashing of
the check and retention of the proceeds. Maxwell v. Provident
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 Wash. 560, 41 P. (2d) 147 (1935).
Section 73
A purported acceptance made after the offer has expired is a
counter-offer and cannot be regarded by the original offeror as an
acceptance. Wax v. Northwest Seed Company, 189 Wash. 212, 64
P. (2d) 513 (1937). The Restatement was cited.
Section 75 (1) (b)
The provision in a note: "In case of the non-payment of any
interest on said note when due, such interest shall be added to and
become a part of the principal of said note and shall bear interest
at the rate aforesaid", does not bind the obligee to forbear suit
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for interest payments as they mature. The obligor's promise to
pay compound interest is accordingly without consideration even
though the obligee has in fact refrained from suing for such interest as it accrued. Stauffer. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 184 Wash. 431, 51 P. (2d) 390 (1935).
A forfeitable real estate contract being in default, the vendor's
forbearance from declaring a forfeiture affords consideration for
a promise to pay the past-due installments, made by one who had
acquired the vendee's rights under the contract without assuming
the vendee's obligations thereunder. McHugh v. Rosaia, -184 Wash.
463, 51 P. (2d) 616 (1935).
Section 76 (a)
Payment of accrued rent under a lease will not provide consideration for an alleged accord and satisfaction of future rent
thereunder. Seattle Investors Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores,
177 Wash. 125, 30 P. (2d) 956 (1934).
Payment by an employer who is bound by Seattle ordinance
60812 of less than the wage stipulated in such ordinance will not
support an alleged accord and satisfaction with his employee.
Goebel v. Elliott, 178 Wash. 444, 35 P. (2d) 44 (1934).
X, having contracted with Y to dump dirt in a specified portion of Elliott Bay, performed in part so carelessly as to make it
impossible to continue dumping there. Although X would have
been bound to bear the additional expense entailed in dumping
at another place, Y's promise to share such expense is enforceable
since Y was anxious to expedite the work and X has acted on the
promise. Nelson v. Seattle, 180 Wash. 1, 38 P. (2d) 1034 (1934).
This decision appears to be contra to the Restatement.
Payment of the principal sum admitted by a debtor to be due
will support an accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim for
interest on such debt. Paulsen Estate Inc. v. Naches-Selah Irrigation District,190 Wash. 205, 67 P. (2d) 856 (1937). See, too, the
decisions annotated under Section 417.
Sections 76 (a) and (b)
Salvage of but $400 remaining after a fire in a building insured
for $10,000, the loss is as a matter of law total. The valued policy
statute, Rem. 7150 and 7151, thus comes into operation despite
the insurer's contention that the loss is partial. The face amount
of the policy being due the payment by the insurer of less than
that sum will not support an accord and satisfaction of the policy.
Grandview Inland Fruit Company v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 189
Wash. 590, 66 P. (2d) 827 (1937).
See also the cases annotated under Section 417.
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Section 76 (b)
A loss occurred under an accident insurance policy which stipulated for reduced benefits should the insured be injured while
engaged in an occupation more hazardous than that indicated in
the policy. The insurer's surrender of a bona fide contention that
the insured was in a more hazardous occupation when injured
affords consideration for the insured's promise to receive in full
settlement sums less than were provided on the face of the policy.
Clubb v. Sentinel Life Insurance Co., 181 Wash. 284, 42 P. (2d)
792 (1935). See also the cases annotated under See. 417.
Section 79
The promise of the employer in a contract of employment
terminable at his pleasure will not provide consideration for the
employee's promise not to compete upon termination of the employment. Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P. (2d) 273
Section 81
(1934).
The promise of an assignee thereof to pay the rents reserved
in a lease is not shown to be gratuitous by evidence which indicates that when he received the assignment he paid to the assignor
in money a sum which was the full valuation set by the parties
on the lease. Puget Mill v. Kerry, 183 Wash. 542, 49 P. (2d)
Section 82
57 (1935).
An alleged accord and satisfaction between insurer and insured
recited a cash payment by the insurer as consideration for a release of its liability. This consideration failed. The insurer may
not introduce parol evidence to show the existence of other consideration for such release. Grandview Inland Fruit Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 590, 66 P. (2d) 827 (1937). This
situation, although not covered by the language of See. 82, appears
to have been contemplated by the draftsmen as coming within the
rule of the section. See the first illustration. If this assumption
be accurate, the case is contra to the Restatement.
Section 84
Services rendered gratuitously will not provide consideration
for the recipient's later promise to pay. Irons Investment Co. v.
Richardson, 184 Wash. 118, 50 P. (2d) 42 (1935). This situation
is not within the purview of See. 84. It belongs, however, with
the miscellaneous problems annotated under that section for lack
of a better place. See Washington Annotations, page 42.
Section 86
To the earlier annotations add: Liberman v. Gurensky, 27
Wash. 410, 67 Pac. 998 (1902) ; Hein v. Formey, 164 Wash. 309, 2
P. (2d) 741 (1931).
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Section 90
To the earlier annotations add: Coleman v. Larson, 49 Wash.
321, 95 Pac. 262 (1908) ; Hudson v. Ellsworth, 56 Wash. 243, 105
Pac. 463 (1909) ; Raymond v. Hatrick, 104 Wash. 619, 177 Pae. 640
(1919).
Section 122
The liability of a joint contract obligor is not diminished by
a release of his co-obligors, where the release reserves the obligee's
rights against such obligor. North Pacific Service Co. v. Clark,
185 Wash. 132, 52 P. (2d) 1255 (1936). The Restatement was
cited.
Section 133 (1) (a)
Stover v. Winston Bros., 185 Wash. 416, 55 P. (2d) 821 (1936).
Section 133 (1) (b)
isurance cases: Keseleff v. Sunset Highwaj, etc. Co., 187
Wash. 642, 60 P. (2d) 720 (1936) ; Mitchell v. Cadwell, 188 Wash.
257, 62 P. (2d) 41 (1936). In both cases the plaintiff was found
to be no beneficiary.
Miscellaneous: First National, etc. Co. v. United States Trust
Co., 184 Wash. 212, 50 P. (2d) 904 (1935).
Section 133 (1) (c)
Pacific Mercantile Agency, Inc. v. First National Bank, 187
Wash. 149, 60 P. (2d) 6 (1936).
Section 135 (a)
Seattle contracted with X for the erection by the latter of a
dam, the contract requiring X to pay his laborers certain minimum
wages. X paid less. The laborers can recover of X the difference between wages paid and wages stipulated to be paid by X's
contract with Seattle. Stover v. Winston Bros. Co., 185 Wash.
416, 55 P. (2d) 821 (1936).
Section 136 (1) (a)
X promised Y to pay to W one half of Y's debt to W. W may
enforce X's promise. First National, etc. Co. v. United States
Trust Co., 184 Wash. 212, 50 P. (2d) 904 (1935). The Restatement was cited. X's promise was, by its own terms, to pay to Y
half of Y's debt to W. The court, however, appears to construe
the promise as one to pay W.
Section 140
The employer's assent to a "President's Re-employment Agreement" entered into between President Roosevelt and an employer
pursuant to the N. I. R. A. was induced by duress and the promise
therein that the employer would maintain indicated wage levels
is unenforcible by his employees. McDonald v. Pend Oreille, etc.
Co., 189 Wash. 389, 65 P. (2d) 1250 (1937).
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Section 142
The interest of a life insurance beneficiary is subordinate to
that of an assignee of the policy, although the insured's reserved
power to change beneficiaries permitted the naming of a new
beneficiary from a limited class only. Massachusetts Mutual Life
Ins Co. v. Bank, 187 Wash. 565, 60 P. (2d) 675 (1936).
Section 144
Corkrell v. Poe, 100 Wash. 625, 171 Pac. 522 (1918), was followed in Citizens, etc. Society v. Chapman, 173 Wash. 539, 24 P.
(2d) 63 (1933).
Section 147
X contracted to sell land to Y. Y was to construct a barn on
the property and improve other buildings. X was to furnish
$1,200 worth of material to be used in such work. W, who sold
to Y lumber used in making the improvements, cannot sue X on
X's promise to Y. Pacific Mercantile Agency, Inc. v. First
National Bank, 187 Wash. 149, 60 P. (2d) 6 (1936).
Section 150 (2)
Under Washington statutes an assignee for collection is an
assignee for value and may sue in his own name despite the fact
that the assignor also has an interest in the chose. Washington
State Bar Assn. v. Merchants Rating and Adjusting Co., 183
Wash. 611, 49 P. (2d) 26 (1935).
Section 151 (c)
A provision in a real estate contract, prohibiting an assignment of his interest by the vendee save with consent of the vendor,
is enforceable. An unauthorized assignee acquires no rights under
the contract. Bethel v. Matthews, 187 Wash. 175, 59 P. (2d) 1125
(1936).
A life insurance policy provision indicating that the insurer
will recognize no assignment not properly filed at its home office
may be invoked only by the insurer. Massachusetts Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Bank, 187 Wash. 565, 60 P. (2d) 675 (1936).
Section 166 (1)
A promise to pay a debt from the proceeds of a certain crop
is not an assignment of such proceeds. Sneesby v. Livington, 182
Wash. 229, 46 P. (2d) 733 (1935).
Section 167 (1)
"County warrants are not negotiable instruments. While assignable, the assignee takes title subject to any defect, irregularity, or illegality in their issue." State v. Burnham, 185 Wash.
556, 56 P. (2d) 170 (1936).
Section 180
X, having contracted to drill for oil on Y's property, stopped
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work because Y defaulted on its promise to pay. W's oral promise to X to pay for both past and future drilling if X would continue his performance is unenforceable. Jannsen v. Curtis, 182
Wash. 499, 47 P. (2d) 662 (1935). The court did not mention
the requisite indicated in Sec. 180, i. e., that there exist a suretyship relation between Y and W.
Section 184
That a surety owns half the stock of the principal, a corporation,
will not, without further proof of benefit to the surety, render an
oral promise of suretyship enforceable. Jannsen v. Curtis, 182
Wash. 499, 47 P. (2d) 662 (1935).
Section 192
R. R. S. Sec. 5825 (3) in excluding mutual promises to marry
does not mean that oral contracts to marry are entirely outside
the Statute of Frauds. R. R. S. Sec. 5825 (1) is applicable to
such contracts. Brock v. Button, 187 Wash. 27, 59 P. (2d) 761
(1936). The Restatement was cited.

Section 197
"Under a parol contract, where the purchaser takes possession
and makes permanent improvements, we have held that, because
of such part performance, the statute of frauds does not apply."
Manke v. Peterson, 181 Wash. 185, 42 P. (2d) 39 (1935). The
action was not for specific performance. It was an action at law
to recover danages for breach of a real estate contract and carries the doctrine of part performance further than is contemplated by See. 197.
The doctrine of part performance will not be applied to an oral
contract which comes under R. R. S. See. 5825 (1) (contracts not
to be performed within one year), Hamilton v. Atlas Freight,
Inc., 184 Wash. 199, 50 P. (2d) 522 (1935).
Section 198
A written contract in which X undertakes to haul freight for
Y during a five-year period and to post a bond guaranteeing his
performance, and Y undertakes to pay for such service, becomes
an oral contract and unenforceable when Y orally waives its right
to the bond. Hamilton v. Atlas Freight, Inc., 184 Wash. 199, 50
P. (2d) 522 (1935). Cf. Gabrielson v. Swinburne, 184 Wash.
242, 51 P. (2d) 368 (1935).
An oral contract to marry, not to be performed within a year,
is unenforceable under R. R. S. See. 5825 (1). Brock v. Button,
187 Wash. 27, 59 P. (2d) 761 (1936).
Section 199
.X loaned Y funds to finance in part the raising of a hop crop.
Y promised orally to sell the crop to X, the debt to be repaid
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from the proceeds of such sale. When harvested, the crop was
set aside in Y's warehouse, intended for delivery to X, but still
stamped with Y's initials. The loan did not constitute "payment" under R. R. S. 5836-4. Nor did the segregation of the
hops, coupled with the mental determination that they were to go
to X, constitute delivery. Rivard v. Loudon, 184 Wash. 234, 50
P. (2d) 914, 50 P. (2d) 1151 (1935).
Section 205
A loan from X to Y, used to finance in part the raising of a
hop crop, does not constitute "payment" or "earnest" under a
contemporaneous oral contract by which Y was to sell the crop to
X. Rivard v. Loudon, 184 Wash. 234, 50 P. (2d) 914, 50 P. (2d)
1151 (1935).
Section 223
A written contract, required by the Statute of Frauds to be
written, becomes oral and unenforceable when modified by an
oral agreement. Hamilton v. Atlas Freight, Inc., 184 Wash. 199,
50 P. (2d) 522 (1935). This case is contra to the Restatement.
Section 226
An instruction informing the jury that the "principal rule in
the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the true intention
of the parties" states the law correctly. Stusser v. Gottstein,
178 Wash. 360, 35 P. (2d) 5 (1934). Cf. Comment (b) See. 230,
Restatement.
Section 230
"The intention of the parties to a contract, when clearly expressed in the instrument, must govern. (cases cited.) Where the
contract is unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be
derived from such construction as can reasonably be given to
the language used and to all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, including the situation of the parties, the subject
matter, and the subsequent acts of the parties under it." (cases
cited.) Thomle v. Sowndveiw Pulp Co., 181 Wash. 1, 42 P. (2d)
19 (1935). See, however, the cases annotated under this Section,
Washington Annotations.
Section 234
See Olympic Securities Co. v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 135 Wash.
307, 237 Pac. 707 (1925).
Section 235 (a) and (b)
United Fig & Date Co. v. Falkenburg, 176 Wash. 122, 28 P.
(2d) 287 (1934) ; Hess v. Business Men's etc. Co., 189 Wash. 71,
63 P. (2d) 535 (1937).
Section 235 (e)
Nelson v. Seattle, 180 Wash. 1, 21, 38 P. (2d) 1034 (1934).
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Section 236
"The rule is well established that, if the recitals are clear and
the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern the construction. If the recitals are ambiguous and the operative part is
clear, the operative part prevails. If both the recitals and the
operative part are clear, but inconsistent with each other, the
operative part is to be preferred." First National etc. Co. v.
United States Trust Co., 184 Wash. 212, 219, 50 P. (2d) 904
(1935).
Section 236 (d)
Insurance cases: Brown v. Northwestern Mutual Fire Assn.,
176 Wash. 693, 30 P. (2d) 640 (1934). In Samarzich v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 180 Wash. 379, 40 P. (2d) 129 (1935), and Miller
v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 269, 64 P. (2d) 1050
(1937), the rule of this subsection was refused application, on
the ground that the contract was not ambiguous.
Miseellaneous contracts: Nelson v. Seattle, 180 Wash. 1, 9, 38
P. (2d) 1034 (1934); Stephenson v. Kenworthy Grain etc. Co.,
186 Wash. 114, 56 P. (2d) 1301 (1936); Rumas v. Baldwin, 188
Wash. 558, 62 P. (2d) 1345 (die.) (1936) ; Irwin v. Pacific Fruit
& Produce Co., 188 Wash. 572, 63 P. (2d) 382 (die.) (1936).
Section 236 (e)
A typewritten portion of a contract controls over the printed
portion thereof, where the two are not reconcilable. Creditors
Assn. v. Frey, 179 Wash. 339, 37 P. (2d) 688 (1934).
Although a rider attached to an insurance policy will be construed together with the printed portion of the policy, if there
be an irreconcilable conflict between them the rider controls.
Miller v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 269, 64 P. (2d)
1050 (1937).
Section 237
Samarzich v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 Wash. 379, 40 P. (2d)
129 (1935); Ross v. Cappon, 185 Wash. 389, 55 P. (2d) 329
(1936) (the possible applicability of the rule of See. 240 was
not discussed); Lally v. Graves, 188 Wash. 561, 63 P. (2d) 361
(1936) (holding that the inadmissibility of evidence, because of
the parol evidence rule, cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal); Webb etc. Co. v. Coyle, 188 Wash. 658, 63 P. (2d) 475
(1936); Grandview Inland Fruit Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
189 Wash. 590, 66 P. (2d) 827 (1937).
Section 238 (a)
Stusser v. Gottstein, 178 Wash. 360, 35 P. (2d) 5 (1934).
Section 238 (b)
Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 177 Wash. 659, 33 P. (2d)
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82 (1934); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Romano Eng. Corp.,
188 Wash. 290, 62 P. (2d) 445 (1936).
Section 238 (c)
Mossuto v. United States Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 481, 492,
40 P. (2d) 170 (1935).
Section 240 (1)
A written conditional sale contract for the purchase of a car
will not bar proof of a contemporaneous oral contract by which
the vendor promised to indemnify the vendee for any loss he
might sustain in consequence of entering into the conditional
sale contract. Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 177 Wash. 659,
33 P. (2d) 82 (1934). (See Annotations to Section 493 (e), below.)
A written contract for the sale of a dry cleaning business by
Y Corp. to X will not bar proof of an oral contemporaneous contract by which S, a shareholder of Y Corp., promised not to compete with X. United Dye Works v. Strom, 179 Wash. 41, 35 P.
Section 246 (b)
(2d) 760 (1934).
In an action on an express oral contract to buy and sell oysters,
P contends that D promised to pay 10c per bushel. D contends
that he promised to pay, not on a bushel basis, but on the quantity
of canned oysters produced from those purchased of P. Since
the contract is unambiguous under either version, D may not
introduce evidence of custom in order to sustain his position.
Katzer v. Cron & Dehn, 183 Wash. 215, 48 P. (2d) 204 (1935).
Section 247
"To establish a custom tacitly attending the obligations of a
contract, it must be shown to be uniformly prevalent and universally observed, so that it may be said that the contracting
parties either had such custom in mind or else must be presumed
to have had it in mind, and consequently to have contracted with
reference to it. Furthermore, the evidence to establish custom
must be clear and convincing, free from ambiguity, uncertainty
or variability. It must be positively established as a fact, and
not left to be drawn as an inference from isolated transactions."
Washington Brick etc. Co. v. Anderson, 176 Wash. 416, 29 P.
Section 250 (a)
(2d) 690 (1934).
Cases involving insurance contracts and denying relief because
a condition precedent was not satisfied nor excused: Rivers v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Wash. 674, 30 P. (2d) 663 (1934);
Kearns v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 178 Wash. 235, 34 P. (2d)
888 (1934); Eakle v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 185
Wash. 520, 55 P. (2d) 1072 (1936).
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Cases involving insurance contracts and holding that a condition
precedent was satisfied or inoperative: Bloss v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 176 Wash. 1, 28 P. (2d) 303, 33 P. (2d) 375
(1934) (court evenly divided); Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
176 Wash. 36, 28 P. (2d) 310 (1934); Hedrick v. Washington
National Ins. Co., 186 Wash. 263, 57 P. (2d) 1038 (1936); Lienhard v. Northwestern etc. Assn., 187 Wash. 47, 59 P. (2d) 916
(1936).
Section 257
The -varying consequences of breach of promise and failure of
conditions to occur, in contracts for the sale of personal property,
are discussed in Crandall Engineering Co. v. Winslow etc. Co., 188
Wash. 1, 61 P. (2d) 136 (1936).
Section 258
Kearns v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 178 Wash. 235, 34 P.
(2d) 888 (1934).
Section 267 (b)
The duty to pay and the duty to convey are dependent and
concurrent, where D was to repurchase property upon demand
made by P prior to an indicated date. Stusser v. Gottstein, 178
Wash. 360, 35 P. (2d) 5 (1934).
Section 273 (1)
Normally, the vendor under a contract for the sale of land may
not forfeit the contract, all payments thereunder being due, without first tendering a deed. This rule will not, however, be applied where the contract stipulates that the vendor is purchasing
the property from X and that the payments accruing under his
contract with X will be made fron' the vendee's payments to the
vendor. Learn v. Downing, 178 Wash. 223, 34 P. (2d) 885
(1934).
A notice by the vendor under a contract for the sale of land
that he elects to forfeit the contract for non-payment, is inoperative unless accompanied by a tender of conveyance, all payments
due from the vendee having accrued. Such notice is not, however, a breach of the contract by the vendor and he may later put
the vendee in default by tendering a deed. Davis v. Downie Investment Co., 179 Wash. 470, 38 P. (2d) 215 (1934).
Section 276 (a)
Failure to pay on the due date subjects a real estate contract
to forfeiture, time being expressly made of the essence. Alhadeff
v. Van Slyke, 176 Wash. 244, 28 P. (2d) 797 (1934).
A provision in a contract, making time of the essence thereof,
may be waived. Townsend v. Rosenbaum, 187 Wash. 372, 60 P.
(2d) 251 (1936).
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Section 276 (b)
Time is of the essence in an option contract for the sale of corporation shares; no express stipulation to that effect is necessary.
Andersen v. Brennen, 181 Wash. 278, 43 P. (2d) 19 (1935).
Where a contract for freight hauling is expressly conditioned
upon P's getting a state contract-hauler permit, P has a reasonable time within which to procure such a permit. Bracy v. United
Retail Merchants, 189 Wash. 162, 63 P. (2d) 491 (1937).
Section 284
H and W contracted to sell land to P, the price to be paid in
installments. They then conveyed the land to X Corporation, the
shares of which they owned. P refused to pay until the property
was reconveyed to the vendors, whereupon the latter declared the
contract to be forfeited. P sought to recover the payments he had
made, arguing that the conveyance in question excused his further
performance, and that the declaration of forfeiture was a breach
of contract. Held: Since H and W controlled their corporate
grantee, the conveyance did not excuse P's non-performance.
Bruener v. Hillman, 186 Wash. 663, 59 P. (2d) 731 (1936).
Section 295
R contracted to sell land to E, the contract indicating that R
was buying the property from X and that R's payments to X
were to be made from E's payments to R. Upon E's default and
even after maturity of the entire purchase price, R may forfeit
the R-E contract without tendering a deed to E. Learn v. Downing, 178 Wash. 223, 34 P. (2d) 885 (1934).
By the terms of their contract D was to pay P a sum of money
in each year that D handled a. stipulated quantity of apples from
D's land. D handled most of the crop, but. refused to receive the
small additional amount which would have raised the total to the
quantity upon which its promise to P was conditioned. Held:
D must pay to P the sum promised. Field v. Northwestern Fruit
Exchange, 180 Wash. 580, 40 P. (2d) 985 (1935).
In the course of their negotiations P and D agreed on the terms
of a proposed contract, but D conditioned his obligation upon the
execution of a written contract. D, having thereafter refused to
join with P in a written contract, may not avail himself of the
condition. Payne v. Ryan, 183 Wash. 590, 49 P. (2d) 53 (1935).
Section 297
Cases involving insurance contracts, waiver found: Reynolds v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 176 Wash. 36, 28 P. (2d) 310 (1934) ; Watts
v. Federal etc. Co., 181 Wash. 679, 44 P. (2d) 197 (1935) ; Hedrick v. Washington Natl. Ins. Co., 186 Wash. 263, 57 P. (2d) 1038
(1936) ; Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 315, 65 P. (2d)
391 (1937).
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Case involving insurance contract, no waiver found: Eakle v.
Hayes, 185 Wash. 520, 55 P. (2d) 1072 (1936).
One who has contracted to buy real estate waives the delay
of his vendor in furnishing title insurance as agreed, by continuing his own performance without protest. Alhadeff v. Van Slyke,
176 Wash. 244, 28 P. (2d) 797 (1934) ; Nagel v. Edmonston, 178
Wash. 577, 35 P. (2d) 64 (1934). The vendor's right to prompt
payment is unaffected by his receipt of several earlier payments
after their due date, as he informed the vendee when accepting such
payments that he was not thereby waiving prompt payment of
future installments. Alhadeff v. Van Slyke, 176 Wash. 244, 28 P.
(2d) 797 (1934).
Commercial contract, no waiver found: Vail v. Bailey, 178
Wash. 490, 35 P. (2d) 37 (1934).
Section 298 (1)
Bunge v. Brotherhood etc., 178 Wash. 33, 33 P. (2d) 383
(1934) (no waiver found.)
Section 300
Cases involving real estate contracts in which the court found
a waiver through acceptance of late payments: Townsend v.
Rosenbaum, 187 Wash. 372, 60 P. (2d) 251 (1936); Knowles v.
LaPure, 189 Wash. 456, 65 P. (2d) 1260 (1937).
Case involving conditional sales contracts for the purchase of
personal property: Pearson v. Picco, 181 Wash. 613, 44 P. (2d)
186 (1935).
Section 301
Insanity of the insured does not excuse a policy condition requiring notice of disability. Bloss v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 176 Wash. 1, 28 P. (2d) 303; 33 P. (2d) 375 (1934).
(Judgment for insured in trial court; reversed in a departmental
decision on the ground indicated above, among others; court
evenly divided in a re-hearing en bane); Reynolds v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 176 Wash. 36, 28 P. (2d) 310 (1934).
Section 302
Grosgebauer v. Schneider, 177 Wash. 282, 31 P. (2d) 910
(1934).
Section 303
"The provision in the contract making the engineer's estimates
final is effective, unless the estimates are made on a. fundamentally
wrong basis, or the engineer acts capriciously or arbitrarily in
making them." Coyle Construction Co. v. Skagit County, 177
Wash. 520, 32 P. (2d) 106 (1934).
Section 306
The vendor under a contract for the sale of land may maintain
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an action for the purchase price despite his failure to tender a
conveyance, it appearing that such a tender would have been
refused by the vendee. First National Bank v. Mapson, 181
Wash. 196, 42 P. (2d) 782 (1935).
Section 311
Despite prior indulgences allowed to the vendee, a real estate
contract may be forfeited by the vendor after reasonable notice
of his intention to do so unless delinquencies be paid up. Cranston v. Boileau, 177 Wash. 640, 33 P. (2d) 96 (1934) ; Nagel v.
Edmonston, 178 Wash. 577, 35 P. (2d) 64 (1934).
Section 314
Case involving real estate contract: Knowles v. LaPure, 189
Wash. 456, 65 P. (2d) 1260 (1937).
Cases involving contracts for the sale of personal property:
Poston v. Western Dairy Products Co., 179 Wash. 73, 36 P. (2d)
65 (1934) ; Harris v. Puget Sound, etc. Co., 179 Wash. 546, 38 P.
(2d) 354 (1934); Parks v. Sterling Box Machine Co., 186 Wash.
269, 57 P. (2d) 1032 (1936) ; CramndallEngineering Co. v. Winslow
Marine etc. Co., 188 Wash. 1, 61 P. (2d) 136 (1936); Heian v.
Fischer, 189 Wash. 59, 63 P. (2d) 518 (1937).
Section 315
Payne v. Ryan, 183 Wash. 590, 49 P. (2d) 53 (1935).
Section 329
Contracts for the sale of personal property: Gatke v. MoDuffie,
178 Wash. 107, 34 P. (2d) 348 (1934) ; Poston v. Western Dairy
Products Co., 179 Wash. 73, 36 P. (2d) 65 (1934).
Section 331
Automatic Canteen Co. of Washington v. Automatic Canteen
Co. of America, 182 Wash. 133, 45 P. (2d) 41 (1935).
Section 337
Nelson v. Seattle, 180 Wash. 1, 38 P. (2d) 1034 (1934) ; Woodbridge v. Johnson, 187 Wash. 191, 59 P. (2d) 1135 (1936).
Section 339 (1)
The insertion of a forfeiture clause in a contract for the sale
of personal property, without stipulating that forfeiture shall be
the seller's only remedy, merely makes available an additional
type of relief and does not impair the seller's normal remedies.
Blass v. Waldrip, 176 Wash. 324, 29 P. (2d) 403 (1934). Same
holding, contract for the sale of real property. Reiter v. Bailey,
180 Wash. 230, 39 P. (2d) 370 (1934). But where a contract
for the sale of real property provides that the contract "shall be
considered by both parties as null and void in every tenor and
effect" upon surrender by the buyer of his copy of the contract
or of a quit claim deed, after compliance by the buyer with the
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indicated conditions he cannot be held for the purchase price.
Mogul Logging Co. v. Smith Livesey Wright Co., 185 Wash. 509,
55 P. (2d) 1061 (1936).
Where the seller of personal property expressly limits his liability for breach of warranty to replacement, the buyer cannot hold
him for other damages. Crandall Engineering Co. v. Winslow
Marine, etc. Co., 188 Wash. 1, 61 P. (2d) 136 (1936).
Case holding a liquidated damages provision to be enforceable:
Moster v. WoodelZ, 189 Wash. 583, 66 P. (2d) 353 (1937).
Section 347 (1) (a)
Cases involving real estate contracts: Upon destruction by fire
of the dwelling house situated upon the lots contracted to be sold
the vendee may avoid the contract and recover the payments he
has made plus interest thereon. But the vendor may offset against
such recovery the reasonable rental value of the vendee's occupancy of the property. Johnson v. Stalcup, 176 Wash. 153, 28 P.
(2d) 279 (1934). Upon breach by the vendor the vendee is entitled
to "the return of the payments made under the contract, with
interest thereon at the legal rate from date (vendor) repossessed
the property, less the reasonable value of the use of the property
from the date the (vendee) entered into possession to the date the
(vendor) unlawfully repossessed the property." Knowles v. LaPure, 189 Wash. 456, 65 P. (2d) 1260 (1937).
Under a forfeiture clause the vendor may, upon the vendee's
default, terminate the latter's interest in the property. Barrett
v. Bartlett, 189 Wash. 482, 65 P. (2d) 1279 (1937).
Section 347 (2)
See Section 347 (1) (a).
Section 357 (1) (a)
P contracted to sell a specified quality of coal. P mixed coal
of this quality with inferior grades and delivered the mixture
under its contract. Held: P cannot recover for the coal so delivered. Continental Coal Co. v. United Fuel Co., 176 Wash. 271,
29 P. (2d) 395 (1934).
Section 370
Specific enforcement will be refused where the alleged contract
is not proved by clear and certain evidence. Lager v. Berggren,
187 Wash. 462, 60 P. (2d) 99 (1936).
Section 375 (1)
State ex ret Union etc. Assn. v. Sup. Ct., 176 Wash. 482, 30
P. (2d) 231 (1934) (Restatement cited) ; Barrett v. Bartlett, 189
Wash. 482, 65 P. (2d) 1279 (1937).
Section 384 (1)
P sued to rescind a real estate contract on the ground of fraud.
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D made counter-claim to recover damages for P's breach of the
contract. Held: That the counter-claim constituted an acquiescence in the rescission sought by P, leaving to D only the action
for damages. Russell v. Stephens, 189 Wash. 233, 64 P. (2d) 787
(1937). Reversed on rehearing, 91 Wash. Dec. 279, 71 P. (2d) 30
(1937).
Section 387 (b)
McHugh v. Rosaia, 184 Wash. 463, 51 P. (2d) 616 (1935).
Section 389 (e)
Accord with Crane Co. v. Pacific Heat & Power Co., 36 Wash.
95: Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Grevstadt, 181 Wash. 239, 42 P.
(2d) 43 (1935) ; (dictum) United Pacific Casualty Ins. Co. v. Port
of Everett, 182 Wash. 285, 46 P. (2d) 736 (1935).
Section 394 (1)
"If neither the debtor nor the creditor applies the payment
specially, then the law will apply it to the oldest account." Diettrick Bros. Inc. v. Anderson, 183 Wash. 574, 48 P. (2d) 921 (1935).
Section 397
Material breach: Barrett v. Bartlett, 189 Wash. 482, 65 P.
(2d) 1279 (1937).
Section 399 (1)
P sold to D on conditional sales contract a player piano. The
instrument, being defective, would not play and P failed to
remedy the defect. Held: D is not liable for the price. National
Assn. of Creditors,Inc. v. Ultican, 190 Wash. 109, 66 P. (2d) 824
(1937).
Section 400 (1) (a)
National Assn. of Creditors, Inc. v. Ultican, 190 Wash. 109, 66
P. (2d) 824 (1937).
Section 406
On the facts in the following cases no mutual rescission was
found: Roethemeyer v. Milton, 177 Wash. 650, 33 P. (2d) 99
(1934); Van Keulen v. Sealander, 183 Wash. 634, 49 P. (2d) 19
(1935).
Section 408
A written contract, of a type covered by the Statute of Frauds,
and subsequently modified by oral agreement, is unenforceable.
Hamilton, Inc. v. Atlas Freight, Inc., 184 Wash. 199, 50 P. (2d)
522 (1935). (This case is contra to the Restatement.)
Section 417
Cases in which no consideration was found for an alleged accord
and satisfaction: Seattle Investors Syndicate v. West Dependable
Stores, 177 Wash. 125, 30 P. (2d) 956 (1934); Graham v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 612, 47 P. (2d) 1029 (1935) (also
no mutual assent); Grandview Inland Fruit Co. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 590, 66 P. (2d) 827 (1937).
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An irrigation district may by paying the principal sum of its
bonds afford consideration for an accord and satisfaction discharging its liability both for such bonds and for a disputed claim
for interest thereon. Paulsen Estate, Inc. v. Naches-Selah Irrigation District, 190 Wash. 205, 67 P. (2d) 856 (1937).
Larson v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, was followed in Goebel v. Elliott,
178 Wash. 444, 35 P. (2d) 44 (1937), a case involving Seattle
ordinance No. 60812 relative to the wages to be paid by contractors
on city work.
In connection with the consideration question, to the earlier
annotations add Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378,
201 Pac. 26 (1921); Vigelius v. Vigelius, 169 Wash. 190, 13 P.
(2d) 425 (1932).
Section 417 (b)
Yanoscheck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 176 Wash. 137, 28 P.
(2d) 270 (1934) ; Clubb v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 181 Wash. 284,
42 P. (2d) 792 (1935); Irwin v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 188
Wash. 572, 63 P. (2d) 382 (1936).
Section 420
A creditor who accepts a remittance tendered as full settlement
of his debtor's unliquidated obligation may not thereafter deny
the satisfaction of his claim. Irwin v. Pacific Fruit & Produce
Co., 188 Wash. 572, 63 P. (2d) 382 (1936), (Restatement cited) ;
Paulsen Estate, Inc. v. Naches-Selah IrrigationDistrict,190 Wash.
205, 67 P. (2d) 856 (1937).
Section 422 (1)
On the facts, no account stated found: Stinson v. Stallsmith,
178 Wash. 383, 34 P. (2d) 1117 (1934).
An account stated creates a new cause of action; the Statute
of Limitations starts to run anew at the time the account is
stated. Diettrich Bros. Inc. v. Anderson, 183 Wash. 574, 48 P.
(2d) 921 (1935).
Section 434
X received a note evidencing an antecedent debt and a mortgage
securing the note. He erased his name as obligee of these instruments and substituted that of Y. Later X learned that the alterations made the note and mortgage unenforceable, so he surrendered
them to the obligor. Held: the alteration being without fraudulent purpose X's assignee may enforce the underlying obligation.
Berg v. Poeppel, 181 Wash. 207, 42 P. (2d) 806 (1935).
Where the holder of a note and mortgage so materially alters
the former as to preclude his suing upon it, he may nevertheless
foreclose the mortgage upon showing that the alteration was made
without fraudulent purpose. Hansen v. Lathrop, 182 Wash. 13,
44 P. (2d) 781 (1935).
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Section 455
X contracted to remove the product of road excavation work.
He is not excused by the fact that in wet areas tractor trucks, a
type he did not possess and could not get without increased expense, proved to be necessary. Harms, Inc. v. Meade, 186 Wash.
287, 57 P. (2d) 1052 (1936).
Section 467
See Sec. 455, above.
Section 470 (1)
Depositors Bond Co. v. Christensen, 185 Wash. 161, 53 P. (2d)
312 (1936).
Section 470 (2)
An applicant for fire insurance falsely stated that she had not
previously suffered a fire loss. This misrepresentation is material. Perry v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Wash. 24, 33 P. (2d)
661 (1934).
Section 471 (a)
informed the buyer that the machine
of
a
grader
The seller
would operate satisfactorily under the working conditions described by the buyer. This statement proved to be false. Rescission on the ground of fraud was denied to the buyer because
the misrepresentation did not relate to an existing fact. Webster
v. Romano Engineering Corp., 178 Wash. 118, 34 P. (2d) 428
(1934).
Section 472 (1) (a)
X applied for reinstatement of a lapsed life insurance policy,
stating in her application that she was in good health. Thereafter
and before the insurer had acted upon the application X suffered
hemorrhages of the lungs and learned from her physician that
she had tuberculosis. The insurer was not apprised of these
developments and issued the reinstatement. Held: X's concealment of the information which she acquired between the date of
her application and the date of the reinstatement was fraudulent.
Reilly v. New York Life Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 460, 47 P. (2d) 840
(1935).
Section 474
Statements which would normally be of opinion only, may be
relied on when made by a seller who is an expert to a buyer who
is not. Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33 P. (2d) 105
(1934).
Misrepresentations by the seller of a grader respecting its performance under conditions described by the buyer are not fraudulent, being mere statements of opinion by one who had no special
knowledge of the conditions under which the machine was to be
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used. Webster v. Romano Engineering Corp. 178 Wash. 118, 34
P. (2d) 428 (1934).
The seller of a Diesel engine represented that it would develop
more power than and perform equally as well as a GL 6 Buda
motor. These statements proved to be false, and are held to be
representations of fact. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Romano
Engineering Corp., 188 Wash. 290, 62 P. (2d) 445 (1936).
Section 475
Fishermen who already had a contract for stipulated prices
were induced to sign a supplemental writing in which they agreed
to accept the "going price in the Kodiak district," a price fixed
or capable of being fixed by a few canneries including the employer of these fishermen, under circumstances indicating that
they were unaware of the nature of the instrument they signed
and that the fish company had followed a course deliberately calculated to throw the fishermen off guard. Held: the supplement agreement is inoperative. Knutsen v. Alitak Fish Co., 176
Wash. 169, 28 P. (2d) 334 (1934).
Fraud not found in the evidence presented: Hansen v. Parsons, 180 Wash. 413, 40 P. (2d) 121 (1935).
Section 476
Contract involving real estate: Patrieio v. Scott, 189 Wash.
302, 65 P. (2d) 215 (1937).
Contracts involving personal property: Lambach v. Lundberg,
177 Wash. 568, 33 P. (2d) 105 (1934); Depositors Bond Co. v.
Christensen,185 Wash. 161, 53 P. (2d) 312 (1936) ; Peoples Bank
and Trust Co. v. Romano Engineering Corp., 188 Wash. 290, 62
P. (2d) 445 (1936).
Insurance contracts: Perry v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Wash.
24, 33 P. (2d) 661 (1934); McCann v. Reeder, 178 Wash. 126,
34 P. (2d) 461 (1934); Paulson v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 181
Wash. 526, 43 P. (2d) 971 (1935); Reilly v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 182 Wash. 460, 47 P. (2d) 840 (1935).
Section 477
In the course of negotiations for the purchase and sale of land
the buyer attempted to verify the seller's statement concerning
the balance remaining unpaid on a mortgage covering the property, by consulting W, agent of the mortgagee. W, in the seller's
presence and without correction by the seller, mis-stated the
amount due. Held: The seller is responsible for TV's statement.
Patriciov. Scott, 189 Wash. 302, 65 P. (2d) 215 (1937).
Section 483 (1)
A delay of seven months after discovery of fraud is not such
laches as will bar recission of a purchase of stock. Depositors
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Bond Co. v. Christensen, 185 Wash. 161, 53 P. (2d) 312 (1936).
Section 483 (2)
On the facts, held that the delay was not too great. Lambach
v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33 P. (2d) 105 (1934).
Section 484
There can be no rescission of a conditional sales contract on
the ground of fraud where the vendee, after acquiring knowledge
of the facts, sold a portion of the property as his own. Lucos v.
Andros, 185 Wash. 383, 55 P. (2d) 330 (1936).
Section 487
A life insurance policy containing double indemnity and disability benefits was procured through the insured's fraud. An
incontestable clause applied only to the life insurance feature of
the policy. After the contestable period had elapsed the fraud
was discovered and the insurer sought to cancel the policy and
to reissue it as a life insurance contract only. Held: for the insurer. Paulson v. Montana Life Insurance Co., 181 Wash. 526,
43 P. (2d) 971 (1935).
Section 488
A physician by fraudulently misrepresenting her physical condition induced X to submit to a course of treatment for which X
paid in part. X may recover the payments so made. Barker v.
Weeks, 182 Wash. 384, 47 P. (2d) 1 (1935).
Section 493 (c)
On the facts, no duress found: Bair v. Spokane Savings Bank,
186 Wash. 472, 58 P. (2d) 819 (1936).
Section 493 (e)
X, a car salesman, was required by his employer to purchase a
demonstrator and did so on conditional sales contract. He was
later discharged, defaulted on his car payments and lost the car
to the finance company, to which the contract had been assigned.
X then sued his employer on an alleged oral promise made at the
time of the car purchase, to indemnify X from loss on such purchase. Held: X may prove the oral promise and recover thereon.
Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 177 Wash. 659, 33 P. (2d) 82
(1934). The reasoning of the court is not entirely clear. It is
first pointed out that the subject matter of the oral contract differed from that of the conditional sales contract and hence that
the parol evidence rule would not exclude the former. But the
court goes on, apparently finding that X was forced into buying
the car by "business compulsion," which fact in some way justified admission of the parol evidence proving the indemnity contract.
Assent of the employer to a President's Reemployment Agreement, executed pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act,
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was induced by economic duress. McDonald v. Pend Oreille, etc.
Co., 189 Wash. 389, 65 P. (2d) 1250 (1937).
Section 495
Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 177 Wash. 659, 33 P. (2d)
82 (1934); McDonald v. Pend Oreille etc. Co., 189 Wash. 389,
65 P. (2d) 1250 (1937).
Section 497
On the facts, undue influence found: Re Madden's Estate, 176
Wash. 51, 28 P. (2d) 280 (1934); Reaugh v. Dickey, 183 Wash.

564, 48 P. (2d) 941 (1935).
Section 499
There may be no avoidance of a note and mortgage on the
ground of duress where the obligor made payments on the note
during several years after its execution. Bair v. Spokane Savings
Bank, 186 Wash. 472, 58 P. (2d) 819 (1936).
Section 503
X issued to Y a policy of title insurance, neglecting to show a
mortgage which X intended to except and of which Y was unaware. X may not have reformation of the policy to except this
mortgage. Baumann v. Puget Sound Title Ins. Co., 184 Wash.
9, 49 P. (2d) 914 (1935).
Section 504
Nelson v. Seattle, 180 Wash. 1, 38 P. (2d) 1034 (1934); Miller
v. United Pacific Casualty Ins. Co., 187 Wash. 629, 60 P. (2d)
714 (1936); Stusser v. Gottstein, 187 Wash. 660, 61 P. (2d) 149
(1936).
Section 505
"Now, if the agents of the (insurer), knowing the character
of protection sought by the plaintiff, issued to him a form of
contract that did not in terms furnish this protection, it was a
fraud upon him, and he could prove by parol evidence, as he did,
the terms of his application and the character of protection the
(insurer) agreed to furnish." Mossuto v. United States Casualty
Co., 180 Wash. 481, 40 P. (2d) 170 (1935).
Section 507
Austin v. Dunn, 176 Wash. 453, 29 P. (2d) 740 (1934) ; Mossuto
v. United States Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 481, 40 P. (2d) 170
(1935); Miller v. United Pacific Casualty Ins. Co., 187 Wash.
629, 60 P. (2d) 714 (1936).
Section 508
An insured is bound to examine his policy upon receiving it
and his failure to do so is such. negligence as will bar his later
action to reform the policy. Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi, Inc. v.
General Casualty Co., 189 Wash. 329, 65 P. (2d) 689 (1937)
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(dictum). This view appears to be contra to the Restatement, and
to rest on the ground that the person seeking reformation must
act within reasonable promptness after learning of the facts entitling him to such relief. Since the insured is presumed to know
the contents of his policy when he receives it, undue delay bars
the relief, even though actual knowledge of the policy's contents
is not acquired until some time thereafter.
Section 510
See Sec. 508 above.
Section 511
Blass v. Waidrip, 176 Wash. 324, 29 P. (2d) 403 (1934) ; Friend
v. Continental Coal Co., 186 Wash. 102, 56 P. (2d) 1000 (1936);
Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi, Inc. v. General Casualty Co., 189
Wash. 329, 65 P. (2d) 689 (1937). Smith v. Sunnyside Valley
IrrigationDist., 189 Wash. 577, 65 P. (2d) 1271 (1937).
Section 515 (a)
In a hiring agreement the employee, an optician, promised that
after termination of the employment he would never enter into
the business of optometry in Walla Walla or within one mile of
the corporate limits thereof. This promise imposes an unreasonable
restraint on trade. Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P. (2d)
273 (1934).
Section 515 (c)
The contracts made with its members by a milk producers association organized under Rem. Rev. Stat., See. 2878, and empowered
to operate throughout the state do not create an unlawful monopoly. Olympia Milk Producers Assn. v. Herman, 176 Wash.
338, 29 P. (2d) 676 (1934).
Section 516 (a)
A shareholder in a corporate seller of a wholesale dry cleaning
business located in Seattle covenanted in connection with the sale
never to again engage in the wholesale dry cleaning business in
Seattle. This is not an unreasonable restraint of trade. United
Dye Works v. Strom, 179 Wash. 41, 35 P. (2d) 760 (1934).
Section 516 (e)
Olympia Milk Producers Assn. v. Herman, 176 Wash. 338, 29
P. (2d) 676 (1934). See Section 515 (c) above.
Section 516 (f)
Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P. (2d) 273 (1934) (restraint found to be unreasonable.) See Section 515 (a) above.
Section 525
See Ash v. Clark, 32 Wash. 390, 73 P. 351 (1903); Catton v.
Catton, 69 Wash. 130, 124 Pac. 387 (1912).
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Section 526
A note for $2,400 at 8% interest and maturing in one year,
from which the maker received only $2,000, is usurious. Celian
v. Coast Finanee Corp, 189 Wash. 676, 66 P. (2d) 363 (1937).
Section 550
By reason of Rem. Rev. Stat., See. 420, "common law arbitration does not exist in this state," and an arbitration agreement
which does not comply with the statute will not be enforced.
Smith v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 176 Wash. 569, 30 P. (2d)
656 (1934).
Section 552 (2)
A contract by which an expert witness was to receive $25 per
day plus an additional $25 per day should the litigation terminate
in favor of the promisor is unlawful. Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash.
260, 67 P. (2d) 868 (1937).
Section 570
X, Y and Z were executors of an estate. X and Y made a contract with a firm of which Z was a member for the rendition of
legal services for the estate. The contract is not unlawful. Jones
v. Peabody, 182 Wash. 148, 45 P. (2d) 915 (1935).
Section 574
The operator of a toboggan slide may exempt itself from liability for negligence, by contract with its customers. Broderson v.
Rainier National Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P. (2d) 234 (1936).
(Restatement cited.)
Section 575 (2)
A carload of horses shipped by rail were injured through the
negligence of the carrier. Held, under various provisions of Rem.
Rev. Stat., Sec. 3673-1, that an attempted limitation of liability by
the carrier was ineffective. Wall-a-hee v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 180 Wash. 656, 41 P. (2d) 786 (1935).
Section 580 (1)
"It seems to us self-evident that the public printer was not
the kind of a state officer, and his compensation was not the kind
of compensation, with which our constitution is concerned." The
compensation of such printer may therefore be varied by the
legislature. State ex reZ Hamilton v. Thomas, 176 Wash. 544, 30
P. (2d) 373 (1934).
Only the state may question the power of a foreign corporation,
which has not complied with local statutory regulations, to own
land in Washington and to contract for its sale. Townsend v.
Rosenbaum, 187 Wash. 372, 60 P. (2d) 251 (1936).
Section 580 (2) (a)
Rem. Rev. Stat. 9693 applies to a contract for the purchase of
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a fire protection system by a port commission. Reiter v. Chapman, 177 Wash. 392, 31 P (2d) 1005 (1934).
Rirgstad v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 550, 47 P. (2d)
1045 (1935), (applying Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 7226).
Section 580 (2) (b) and (d)
A real estate broker may not recover for services rendered at
a time when he does not hold a state license. Irons Investment
Co. v. Richardson, 184 Wash. 118, 50 P. (2d) 42 (1935).
Section 580 (2) (d)
An attorney may not recover for services rendered at a time
when he has not complied with Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 139-20. Smith
v. Kneisley, 184 Wash. 26, 49 P. (2d) 916 (1935), (departmental
decision). On re-hearing en banc the court said, without argument: ". . . a majority now entertains the view that the Departmental opinion cannot be sustained . . .", and placed a deci-

sion for the defendant client on another ground. Smith v. Kneisley, 187 Wash. 278, 60 P. (2d) 14 (1936). The same issue arose
again in Niemeier v. Rosenbaum, 189 Wash. 1, 63 P. (2d) 424
(1936), and was summarily dismissed with the observation that
in the re-hearing on Smith v. Kneisley "it was in effect held that
the failure of an attorney to pay such a registration fee would
not preclude him from maintaining an action for legal services
rendered."
Section 584 (1) (a)
A contract for separate maintenance is not opposed to public
policy. Granat v. Granat, 189 Wash. 308, 65 P. (2d) 220 (1937).
Section 598
Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P. (2d) 273 (1934);
Smith v. Department of Labor & Industries, 176 Wash. 569, 30
P. (2d) 656 (1934); Wall-a-hee v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,
180 Wash. 656, 41 P. (2d) 786 (1935); Irons Investment Co. v.
Richardson, 184 Wash. 118, 50 P. (2d) 42 (1935) ; Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash. 260, 67 P. (2d) 868 (1937).
X and Y entered into an unlawful contract, out of which transaction a fund accrued and was deposited in X's name in a savings
association. The passbook was then transferred by X to Y. The
illegality of the transaction does not, as between X and Y, defeat
Y's title to the fund as evidenced by his possession of the passbook. Donahoe v. Pratt, 190 Wash. 103, 66 P. (2d) 873 (1937).
Section 601
"The right to recover usurious or illegal interest accrues, not
from the contract under which usury is paid, nor from any implication contained in the contract itself, but from a duty imposed
by law to repay an unjust and unmerited enrichment."
The
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three year rather than the six year statute of limitations is accordingly applicable. Edwards v. Surety Finance Co., 176 Wash. 534,
30 P. (2d) 225 (1934).
The maker of a note secured by a chattel mortgage may defeat
foreclosure of the mortgage by showing that the note was usurious
and that payments made plus penalties exceeded the unpaid balance thereon. Celian v. Coast Finance Corp., 189 Wash. 676, 66
P. (2d) 363 (1937).
Section 607
The lawful and the unlawful provisions of the exhibitors contract before the court are so inter-related as to preclude enforcement of the former. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Corp. v. Kiggins,
184 Wash. 497, 51 P. (2d) 690 (1935).

